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This work focuses on toehold bidding in the European market, providing a 
comparison base with American studies. I carried out event studies to quantify 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) as a representative measure of 
shareholder’s wealth in M&A transactions where a toehold is present. The 
headline statistically significant result of -1.28% in an [-2; +2] event window for 
core European countries falls short of what is expected when compared with 
American studies. This result is in line with the general idea of contradictory 
results often found in this field as stated in (Malatesta 1983). It agrees as well with 
the review of Haleblian et al. (2009) and with Franks and Harris (1989). It does 
not agree with Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), Carroll and Griffith (2010), Le and 
Schultz (2007) and Farinha and Miranda (2003). To control for other factors and 
characteristics of these events, I ran a cross sectional analysis while finding stock 
as method of payment and revenues of target as statistically significant moderators 
of shareholder’s wealth effects.  
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 This thesis is organized in five sections. In section 1 the economic 
problem is explained while in section 2 the research questions, their importance 
and significance for today’s body of knowledge are presented. In section 3 follows 
the literature review and in section 4 the methodology is laid out. Section 5 
embodies the results of the study while section 6 carries the main conclusions and 
limitations of this study accompanied with future possible roads of study. 
 
1. Economic problem 
 
M&A Toeholds are studied and defined in Asquith and Kieschnick (1999) 
as “The initial shareholding of a bidder in the target firm prior to bidding (Asquith 
and Kieschnick 1999, 1)” 
 
 Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) Established the motivations behind 
toehold bidding: 
 
I. It reduces the number of shares necessary to acquire in the tender offer, at 
the full takeover premium; 
II. In case of no approval, acquirers can sell those shares to the rival bidder 
for a gain (appropriating the takeover premium by selling at that price); 
III. The expected toehold gain has a positive impact in the valuation of the 
target; 
IV. As a result, there is a strong case in order to implement a more aggressive 
bidding strategy that naturally discourages rival bidders to enter the 
contest for the target; 
V. As the value of the target increases, the acquirer with a toehold is the one 
with the highest valuation for the target (as it sees its share of the company 
increase in value as well), and therefore, will tend to bid more 
aggressively; 
VI. Finally, it reduces the target free rider problem Grossman and Hart (1980) 
as there are less shares held by minority shareholders whose sole purpose 
is to receive the control premium paid by first bidders or rivals (to acquire 
control of the target). 
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The study of M&A toeholds has been linked primarily with its impact on 
shareholder’s wealth effects, its moderators, takeover premiums and the 
probability of a successful bid. In this study I will focus on shareholder’s wealth 
effects and its moderators. 
 
 Having defined and explained the reasons for the existence of toehold 
bidding as presented in the literature, I present in the next sections the two main 
research questions I answer in this study. 
 
2. Research questions 
 
The two questions I address in this study are: 
 
I. Is this a value creating strategy?  
II. Is there any other factor other than the presence of a toehold which 
influences the results of question I? 
 
An event study is carried out in order to measure acquirer’s shareholder 
wealth effects as measured by Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) while a 
cross section analysis is implemented to measure the moderators of these gains, 
answering in this way questions I and II, respectively. 
 
2.1. Why is this interesting? 
 
 Answering these questions is interesting in the first place due to the 
novelty of the geographical focus (European Union - EU
1
 as a whole), providing a 
comparison base with American studies. Secondly, by identifying the wealth 
effects and its moderators in the EU, academic and finance professionals can use 
this study as a starting point to better provide advisory services in M&A deals 
while, at the same time, counselling investors and speculators who attempt to time 
the market. 
                                               
1 EU – 27 countries while limited to available data in Zephyr’s database 
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3. Literature Review 
 
 This literature review is organized as follows. First, I present studies 
focused in M&A events, the reasons of its existance and its wealth effects. 
Secondly, the toehold literature is presented focusing on wealth effects, takeover 
premiums, toehold size and regulation. Thirdly, moderators of acquisition as 
advanced in today’s literature are discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn from 
the today’s body of knowledge accompanied by Table I which presents the main 
results from different studies. 
 
3.1. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
 
 To establish the proper language to be used throughout this work, it is 
important to clarify the difference between mergers and tender offers. According 
to Loughran and Anand (1997), mergers are normally friendly which means that 
they enjoy the cooperation of current management. In turn, tender offers are 
directed to the shareholders of the target company, which means that it 
circumvents current management, and may be a signal of higher confidence in the 
ability of the acquirer to realize gains from the acquisition. Nevertheless and for 
the purpose of this study, M&A events, acquisitions, and tender offers, are all 
considered to have interchangeable meanings, similar to the simplification made 
in Haleblian et al. (2009, 470). 
 
 M&A transactions are major events in the life of a company. Changes in 
the capital structure and composition of the equity have impacts in the overall 
business strategy as well as for its focus, priorities and presence in markets and 
business sectors. 
 
 M&A related subjects have been widely researched in the finance 
literature, as “Corporate acquisitions are important events... CRSP tapes shows 
that over half a trillion dollars worth of equity in publicly-traded firms was 
acquired by other publicly traded firms during 1970-1989 (Loughran and Anand 
1997, 1765)” 
 
Thesis GRA 1903  01.09.2012 
 8 
 There are different strategies aimed at delivering successful M&A deals, 
ranging from hiring the best valuation talent in the industry, to being extremely 
savvy in negotiating compensation packages to exploring and exploiting, to the 
acquirer’s advantage, the bylaws of the target. All these strategies have in 
common the objective of maximizing stockholders wealth or, in a broader view, 
stakeholder’s wealth.  
 
 A great effort in the corporate finance literature has been devoted to the 
study of this subject, especially for the American market and, to some extent, 
equally vast in the European market.  
 
 Next, after a brief overview of M&A literature in general by 
acknowledging its importance and the fact that significant literature has been 
produced for this subject, follows the reasons advanced for its existance. 
 
3.1.1. Reasons for M&A activity 
 
 According to the review by Haleblian et al. (2009), journal articles that 
focused on M&A deals have conclusions defending a vast range of standpoints on 
the reasons justifying the existence of M&A events. They vary from value 
creation, characteristics of the transaction, and inter-relations with other motives 
(power seeking, efficiency gains, resource redeployment and market discipline) to 
managerial self-interests and specific firm characteristics.  
 
 More specifically Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993, 350-351) advance in 
their research a method of distinguishing among the synergy, agency and hubris 
motives. By looking at the correlation between target and total gains in 330 tender 
offers between 1963 and 1988, they conclude that synergy is the primary motive 
for takeovers while acknowledging the simultaneous existence of hubris. 
Furthermore, a relationship was found between agency motives and negative total 
gains, indicating a consonant conclusion to what is expected “... agency, and not 
hubris, seems to be the major reason for the existence of value-reducing 
acquisitions (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, 361)”. Overall, they concluded, “... 
on average, takeovers yield positive total gains. This occurs in about 75 per cent 
of the takeovers in the sample (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, 361)”. 
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 The Synergy motive is based on the premise that bidders and targets 
negotiate takeovers when both parties gain from the process. As a result, the 
primary reason that motivate companies to negotiate an M&A transaction is the 
existence of a perception that the two companies complement each other’s 
business operations and together can achieve more than they would alone. 
 
 The Agency motive is rooted in the idea that bidder’s management benefit 
from a transfer of value from shareholders, by satisfying their personal objectives. 
By controlling more assets, increased powers are transferred and concentrated in 
current management, translating into increased dependence of shareholders on 
current management to navigate on an immense group or ambitious acquisition 
program, defended to the point of conveying the idea that it is solely achievable 
by them. 
 
 The Hubris motive is linked with acquirer’s misconceptions about 
synergies or general advantages of a deal. As a result, “since target gains are 
merely a transfer of wealth from acquirers, there will be zero correlation between 
target and total gains (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, 348)”. 
  
 In the review carried out by Haleblian et al. (2009), M&A transactions 




I. Value creation, including seekers of market power, efficiency gains, 
resource redeployment and market discipline;  
II. Managerial self-interest, motivated by compensation, hubris and defence 
tactics;  
III. Environmental factors, including environmental uncertainty, regulation, 
imitation, resource dependence and networks ties; 
IV. Firm characteristics, related with acquisition experience, firm strategy and 
its market positioning. 
 
                                               
2 For more details refer to Haleblian, Jerayr, Cynthia E. Devers, Gerry McNamara, Mason A. 
Carpenter and Robert B. Davison. 2009. "Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and 
Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda." Journal of Management, 35 (3): 469-502. doi: 
10.1177/0149206308330554. 
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 To conclude, the main idea of this section is that M&A activity occurs 
primarily due to expectations of synergy gains, according to Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993), or its equivalent designation in the review of Haleblian et al. 
(2009), for value creation expectations. 
 
3.1.2. M&A Wealth Effects 
 
 Three main patterns can be found in Loughran and Anand (1997) about 
shareholder’s wealth effects studies: 
 
I. Target shareholders earn significant positive abnormal returns from all 
acquisitions; 
II. Acquiring shareholders receive low or none abnormal returns from tender 
offers; 
III. Acquiring shareholders receive negative abnormal returns from mergers. 
 
These three pillars of results exposed in Loughran and Anand (1997) form 
the main structure of results found by many researchers throughout years of 
studies of the subject. Nevertheless, a wide array of hard to compile results and 
evidence can be found, as Malatesta (1983) states “The literature on merger events 
contains conflicting evidence on returns to acquiring firms… (Malatesta 1983, 
180).” 
 
 Some authors find reasons to believe that corporate takeovers are 
beneficial to both acquirers and targets “The proposition that a competitive market 
for corporate control effectively limits managerial divergence from shareholder 
wealth maximization implies that corporate takeovers are beneficial to 
shareholders of both firms involved in the transaction (Eckbo and Thorburn 2000, 
1).” Research results are not all one sided, as divergence in the distribution of 
gains between acquirers and targets is found by several researchers, and justified 
in Agrawal (1992) with “methodological problems and conflicting results of prior 
studies (Agrawal 1992, 1618)” to justify divergence in returns. 
 
 One of many reasons found to explain these differences, besides 
methodological problems, are advanced and related with the speed and manner of 
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the incorporation of information in stock prices, as in Malatesta (1983) and 
Katherine Schipper (1983), “Merger benefits to acquiring firms are likely to be 
reflected in stock values around the time when an acquisition program is initiated 
(Malatesta 1983, 181)”. Therefore, when the acquisition program is announced, 
information is incorporated in the stock price immediately and, as a result, before 
the acquisition itself. This carries the effect that studies around announcement 
date will not be able to quantify the gains as they were already priced in, 
transforming the announcement of the program into a source of noise in the 
sample, distorting results as in Malatesta (1983) “when an attempt occurs will be 
an attenuated measure of the attempt’s net present value (Malatesta 1983, 181)”. 
As a result, “This attenuation may explain why results regarding returns to 
acquiring firms tend to be weak and contradictory (Malatesta 1983, 181)”. 
 
 Chronologically, initial research focused on studying wealth effects of 
M&A activity while simultaneously accompanied by major advances in event 
study methodology exemplified in the techniques of Brown and Warner (1980) 
and Brown and Warner (1985), according to Haleblian et al. (2009). 
 
 In these prior studies, a major focus was directed towards effects to 
acquirer’s shareholders, while some also focused on returns to target firms. 
Historically, target shareholders fared well and “Perhaps not surprising, given that 
acquirers generally pay premiums to acquire targets, results showed that target 
shareholders generally fared well, often experiencing significant positive returns 
(Haleblian et al. 2009, 470)”. 
 
 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) Examined shareholder’s wealth effects in 
European and American M&A events, focusing only on the insurance industry. In 
their sample of 56 deals between 1996 and 2000, they found value accretive 
results for acquirer’s shareholders of 3.65% while identifying as a main positively 
correlated moderator of these gains to be the value of the deal. Not consonant with 
other studies “In sharply contrast with previous literature on financial mergers, we 
find that bidder shareholders increase their wealth (Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, 
12)”. 
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Some studies combined the outcomes of the acquirer and target 
simultaneously, while concluding that targets gains accounted for most of the 
increase in shareholder’s wealth. Bradley (1988) Found that there are positive 
effects resulting from competition between bidding firms to targets while 
decreasing them to acquirer’s “...competition among bidding firms increase the 
returns to targets and decreases the returns to acquirers (Bradley 1988, 3)”. They 
tried to find moderators of these results, finding that “returns to target firms is 
positively related to the fraction of target shares purchased (Bradley 1988, 32)”, 
for that they used a different methodology like the one already spoke based on 
CARs “using the revaluation of the combined wealth of the target-firm and 
acquiring-firm shareholders as basis (Bradley 1988, 4)”. The headline result is that 
between 1963-1984 in 236 deals of both parties quoted in the NYSE or AMEX, 
there is a wealth gain for shareholders of about +7.4%. 
 
 Recent research of this topic is motivated by previous findings concluding 
on the difficulties for acquiring shareholders to benefit from positive wealth 
effects. Therefore, the focus is now for the antecedents of acquisitions in an effort 
to explain the reasons that lead firms to acquire, hoping to find the moderators of 
statistically significant gains in order to enhance future gains. As a result, today’s 
research is directed to identify “… both potential moderators of acquisition 
performance and other acquisition-related outcomes (Bradley 1988, 470)”. In this 
way, it is possible to identify situations where acquisitions benefit acquirer’s 
shareholders. 
  
Furthermore, generally it is acknowledged that acquisitions do not add 
value to acquirers’ shareholders Haleblian et al. (2009, 470), although there are 
situations in which value added outcomes can be identified. “Although this work 
confirms that, on average, acquiring firms do not benefit from acquisitions, it 
importantly reveals conditions and situations under which acquisitions do benefit 
acquirers (Haleblian et al. 2009, 470)”. 
 
 According to (Loughran and Anand 1997) there exists a relationship 
between the mode of acquisition and the expected wealth gains that may 
eventually result from synergies between the two operating units. They found: 
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I. Significant and positive abnormal returns for the bidders’ stock in deals 
where the method of payment was cash, as well as in horizontal mergers, 
during the 1960’s; 
II. During the 1980’s bidder’s shareholders experienced negative average 
abnormal returns in all-stock mergers; 
III. Abnormal returns have a tendency to be lower the higher the competition 
in the deal. Therefore, high interest manifested by many rival bidders is an 
indicator for succeeding bidders to have lower abnormal returns; 
IV. Finally, declining acquirer’s performance declines in the two to five year 
period after the merger announcement (Eckbo and Thorburn 2000). 
 
To conclude, after presenting the three pillars of results, the reasons of 
result’s divergence among different studies and the recent focus on wealth 
moderators, a relationship between M&A and regulation is exposed which may be 
relevant in a multi-country sample such as the one in this work. This is relevant in 
this study as toehold regulation of different countries can have an impact on 
results, if found to be significantly different. 
 
3.1.3. M&A and regulation 
 
 The impact of regulation on the distribution dynamics was studied by 
(Bradley 1988, 31)  “Acquiring firms realized a significant positive gain only 
during the unregulated period 1963-1968 and, in fact, suffered a significant loss 
during the most recent sub period, 1981-1984 (Bradley 1988, 31)”. 
 
 What Bradley (1988) concludes is that as a result of regulation, 
specifically in the US with the Williams Act of 1968, there is a shift in power. 
Due to mandatory disclosures and other rules, the wealth effects resulting from 
M&A activity is seen to shift from acquirers to targets. These requirements are a 
form of antitakeover law, which won’t apply in private companies as they can 
always simply choose not to sell to that bidder. 
  
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) Exemplifies with the requirements 
of the Williams Act in the US and outlines that this empirical observation only 
applies to public targets. A headline conclusion can be found in Bradley (1988) 
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“Thus, government regulations and other changes that have occurred in the tender 
offer environment have been a zero sum game: the increase in the gains to the 
target stockholders has come at the expense of the stockholders of acquiring firms 
Bradley (1988, 31)”.  
 
 To conclude, the main idea is that regulations have shifted the balance of 
gains towards target’s shareholders, at the expense of acquirer’s, making the case 
for Toehold bidding even stronger while laying back on the papers of Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2000), Carroll and Griffith (2010), Le and Schultz (2007) and Farinha 
and Miranda (2003), which found toehold bidding as a value accretive strategy. 
 
3.2. M&A Toeholds 
 
 A toehold consists on having a share or portion of another company, prior 
to making a bid to acquire control. This translates into owning less than 50% 
before the bid for control, assuming no modifications to bylaws or emission of 
different share classes (awarding discriminating voting rights). 
 
 The literature that studies all the nuances of toehold bidding is acceptably 
vast, although, primarily focused on the American market. Nevertheless, a major 
motivation for the study of this subject is the potential interest of management and 
finance professionals or professors to understand the drivers and sources of value 
of toehold bidding. In the words of (Bris 1998) “The observation of stock price 
dynamics before tender offer announcements indicates that potential acquirers 
should be interested in making prior open market purchases of the target shares 
(Bris 1998, 1)’’ 
 
 Bris (1998) Addresses in his paper why toehold bidding is not that much 
present as theoretically is hinted “Why is it then that only around 15% of bidders 
follow the optimal strategy ... (Bris 1998, 1)”. In fact, “The bidder is likely able to 
acquire the toehold at a substantially lower price per share than necessary to 
acquire the remaining shares in a takeover (Asquith and Kieschnick 1999)”. 
 
 Furthermore, according to Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), ‘‘the 
substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a 
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compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) in the market prior to 
launching a bid (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn 2009, 158)’’.  
 
In this tone, there is a case for toehold bidding as it may guarantee higher 
returns as some shares are acquired cheaply, increasing returns. And, as stated in 
the title of Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), it is a puzzle as it is not as 
common as perception would lead to believe. 
 
3.2.1. M&A Toeholds Wealth Effects 
 
 In Carroll and Griffith (2010), a return comparison between hostile bids 
with and without a toehold for the acquirer’s shareholders are examined in a 
sample of 294 hostile tender offers for the period between 1985-2007. 
Interestingly enough, they find that unsolicited bids (hostile) increase incentives 
for target’s management to seek other bidders, which in turn enhances the returns 
for the original bidder on the toehold already owned, which on average is of 
13.81%. This translates into significant abnormal returns of 4.98% compared with 
0.06% when there is no toehold. Additionally, it is probable that bidders with less 
than 35% of share capital or voting rights will simply use the toehold to 
appropriate some capital gains by enjoying the run up in price during the bidding 
contest and closing the position before the conclusion of the deal.  
 
 Despite these gains, Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) identified a 
“puzzle”, as mentioned before, or contradiction in the American market as only 
13% among more than 10’000 initial bids were toehold bidding was present 
between 1973-2002, with an average control premium of 45%. This shows that 
toehold bidding is extremely rare while theoretically it should be more frequent, 
given its advantages. Comparing this study with the one of Carroll and Griffith 
(2010) a different result in terms of the mean toehold can be found. In fact, the 
mean toehold in this study is of 20% vs 13% in the former, nevertheless, Carroll 
and Griffith (2010) focused more in hostile bids where “… toeholds are the norm 
in hostile bids (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn 2009, 158)”. A major conclusion of 
this study is that they identify two optimal strategies in toehold bidding, namely, 
to not do it at all, avoiding the costs associated with setting it up, or doing it in a 
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sufficient magnitude determined at 9% “… so that toehold benefits offset rejection 
costs (Betton and Eckbo 2000, 158)”.  
 
 Le and Schultz (2007) Studied toeholds and their performance for the 
Australian market over 122 takeover announcements, between 1997 and 2004, for 
listed companies and found that acquirer’s on average do not earn significant 
abnormal returns, nevertheless, comparing gains between two groups – one with 
toeholds and the other without, average abnormal returns of acquirers are in fact 
2.3-2.5% higher than those without a toehold. They conclude “Taken altogether, 
these findings preliminarily suggest that the market views toeholds as beneficial 
for the bidders (Le and Schultz 2007, 333)”. 
 
 Farinha and Miranda (2003) Study M&A events in Portugal for the period 
between 1989 and 2001. They conclude “toeholds in target firms significantly 
increases cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidder’s shareholders (Farinha 
and Miranda 2003, 2)”. Although focusing on the effect of toeholds and run up in 
price, they found that the larger the size of the toehold, the larger the gains for 
them, finding 23% abnormal returns for the bidder in Portugal of deals for the 
event window (-40; +40), in their sample of 39 bidders and 52 tender offers, in 
Portugal.  
 
 Franks and Harris (1989) Studied wealth effects in the UK for 1.800 
takeovers between 1955 and 1985, finding that gains associated with toehold 
bidding are approximately equally distributed between acquirer and target while, 
at the same time, targets around announcement date gain 25 to 30% and acquirer’s 
earn close to zero. Furthermore, toehold bidding is indifferent, as it is found to not 
add statistically significant value over non-toehold bids.  
 
 To conclude, Carroll and Griffith (2010), Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2009), Farinha and Miranda (2003), Le and Schultz (2007). In turn, Franks and 
Harris (1989) finds no significant value in toehold bidding while Haleblian et al. 
(2009) conclude in their review that M&A in general is not value accretive. 
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Table I: Short Summary Table of M&A Findings  
    
    
Poulsen (1989) Carried out a study on 450 M&A deals in the USA between 1963-1986 
  He focused on acquirer's shareholders returns 
  
His findings depend on the event window used, but on average they settled on an average CAR of 
1.4% 
    
Malatesta (1983) Carried out a study on 336 M&A deals in the USA between 1969-1974 
  He focused on both acquirer's and target's shareholders 
  In terms of acquirer's shareholders: 
  - For 5 months prior to the announcement date, he found a positive average gain of $ +19.67 millions 
  - For 61 months prior to the announcement date, he found a negative average loss of $ -9.42 millions 
    
    
Agrawal (1992) Carried out a study on 1'164 M&A deals in the USA between 1955-1987 
  He focused on acquirer's shareholders returns 
  Acquirer shareholders suffer a loss of 10% over the 5 years post-merger 
    
Laderer and Martin (1992) Carried out a study in the USA between 1966-1986 
  He found that holding the acquirer's shares 500 trading days after the completion of the merge  
  It would yield an equally weighted return of 21% 
  This compares with the market return of 36% 
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Table I: Short Summary Table of M&A Findings  
  
    
Stulz (2003)  Carried out a study in the USA between 1980-2001 
  He focused on acquirer’s shareholder returns 
  Gains after 1997 for small firms amount to $+8bn while for big firms, losses of $ -226bn are found 
    
    
Malatesta (1983) "The literature on merger events contain conflicting evidence on returns to acquirer's (page 180) 
    
    
Halleblian et al. (2009) Review of M&A literature 
  Addresses the reasons of M&A events  
  Value Creation, Managerial Self Interest, Environmental Factors and Firm Characteristics 
  "Although this work confirms that, on average, acquiring firms do not benefit from acquisitions, it 
importantly reveals conditions and situations under which acquisitions do benefit acquirers (Haleblian 
et al. 2009, 470) 
  
  
    
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) 330 Tender offers between 1963-1988. Synergy is the main motive of M&A activity. 
 
Overall takeovers yield positive gains and occur in about 75% of the sample. 
   
Loughran and Anand (1997) Proposes three main pillars of results in M&A literature: 
  (I) Target shareholders earn significant positive abnormal returns from all acquisitions 
  (II) Acquiring shareholders receive low or non abnormal returns from tender offers 
  (III) Acquiring shareholders receive negative abnormal returns from mergers 
  Relationship between the mode of acquisition and expected wealth gains is found 
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Table I: Short Summary Table of M&A Findings  
  Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) Conducted a study in 1'353 tender offers between 1971-1990 
  Studied probability of takeover success while concluding that corporate takeovers do generate value 
  As the size of the toehold increases, the lower the probability of rival bidders accompanied by lower 
target resistance    
    
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) Shareholder's wealth effects in Europe and US 
  Sample of 56 deals between 1996 and 2000 in the insurance industry 
  Wealth effects are positive to acquirers at +3.65% 
    
Bradley (1998)  Positive effects from competition between bidding firms to targets while decreasing them for acquirers 
  The more shares in target held, the higher the returns for the target 
  Study between 1963-1984 for 236 deals, for listed firms quoted in NYSE and AMEX 
  Headline result presented as positive wealth effects of +7.4% for acquirers 
  Also made some inroads on the impact of regulation - As a result, he finds that most acquirers made  
  money between 1963-68 (before Williams Act) and lost significantly between 1981-84 
    
Betton Eckbo (2009) Control premium is a good reason to acquire toeholds 
  Toehold puzzle as only 13% of deals in their sample use it, despite aparent advantages 
  Sample of 10'000 bids between 1973-2002 with an average control premium of 45% 
  Identify two optimal strategies - no toehold at all or a toehold size of 9% in their sample in order to 
compensate rejection costs   
    
Carroll and Griffith (2010) Deals where a toehold is present has positive abnormal returns of 4.98% compared with 0.06% (w/o 
toehold)   
  Their sample consists of 294 hostile tender offers between 1985-2007 
 
 
Thesis GRA 1903  01.09.2012 
 20 
Table I: Short Summary Table of M&A Findings  
    The average toehold size in their sample is found to be 13.81% 
    
Bris (1998) Do not verify as much toehold bidding as should be given its theoretical advantages 
  Toehold's benefits hold even in adverse regulatory environment as with disclosure rules 
  Finds that toeholds are in fact very rare, amounting to only 15% of deals in his sample 
    
Le & Schultz (2007) Toeholds in the Australian market for 122 takeovers between 1997 and 2004 
  Findings suggest that they do not earn significant abnormal returns for acquirers 
  Nevertheless, there is a difference in returns of around 2.5% vs no toehold bidding 
    
Farinha and Miranda (2003) 23% of abnormal return for [-40; +40] event window, for 39 bidders and 52 tender offers 
    
Frank and Harris (1989) Studied 1'800 takeovers between 1955-85 finding abnormal returns of 25-30% 
    
Asquith (1999) Found negative correlation between toeholds and takeover premiums 
  Argues that the difference in price of toehold shares and the ones acquired at takeover premium is  
  significant  
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3.2.2. Takeover premium  
 
In the review carried out by B. Espen (2009), it is evident another strand of 
literature focusing on the takeover premium and its relationship with bidding 
strategies. For instance, one of the conclusions of their review is that average 
initial offer premiums are approximately of 50%, on average, in their sample. 
Specifically on toehold bidding, they are consonant with Betton, Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2009) as they also find that toehold bidding has decreased substantially 
since 1980’s. He also explains the dynamics of toehold and subsequent 
negotiations. The advantages of toehold bidding were presented already; 
nevertheless, there are a couple of intricacies to understand: 
 
I. As already explained in Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), toeholds are 
rare and large when they occur, as well as they are present mostly in 
hostile bids; 
II. Toeholds need to be large, as on average it compensates for termination 
costs; 
III. These termination costs are not examining the accounts of the target if 
there is no negotiation phase while abdicating of eventual termination 
agreements. 
  
In Asquith and Kieschnick (1999) carried out a study in 827 tender offers 
between 1980-1986.  A negative correlation between initial bidder toeholds and 
premium is found, being consistent with previous research. Their main 
contribution is that they find signals that lead them to believe that target firm size 
significantly influences these results. 
 
3.2.3. Relationship between takeover premium and probability of success 
 
Walkling (1985) Had the concern to study bid premiums in the outcome of 
tender offers “The results confirm the importance of bid premiums ... (Walkling 
1985, 476)”. They studied between 1972 and 1977, estimation sample of 108 
offers. In fact, goes as far as to say that “The results suggest that the anomalous 
findings regarding the bid premium in previous probability models are due to 
specification errors (Walkling 1985, 469)”. 
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3.2.4. Relationship between toehold size and bid premium 
 
Betton and Eckbo (2000) Study the probability of takeover success 
through a contest of different outcomes during the negotiation process, in a 
sample of 1’353 tender offers over the period 1971-1990. They found that as the 
size of the toehold increases, the lower the probability of rival bidders entering the 
contest accompanied by a lower probability of target resistance. Furthermore, the 
larger the toehold size, the lower the bid premium.  
 
 At this point, relationships between wealth effects, bid premiums, 
probability of success and relative size are studied. Next, I present the relationship 
between M&A Toeholds and regulation. 
 
3.2.5. M&A Toeholds and regulation 
 
The works and intricacies of the regulatory processes vary according to 
each country’s laws and regulations, nevertheless the arguments for toehold 
bidding hold. In fact, in some countries it is not necessary to disclose the size of 
the toehold owned (as happens in Italy, de facto (Bris 1998)). 
 
 In Ravid and Spiegel (1999) a relationship between toeholds, takeover 
laws and rival bidders is established. The main conclusions are: 
 
I. Where no competing bidders are to be expected, the acquisition of a 
toehold is not necessary; 
II. Larger toeholds do no necessarily discourage rival bidders, as a result, that 
is why many toeholds are small; 
III. The logic of acquiring a toehold, among others, permits the first bidder to 
profit from it even if he loses. 
 
 It is generally acknowledged that regulation does have an impact on the 
way the market for corporate control functions, as if influences the behaviour and 
constitution of the toehold by instituting as mandatory the disclosure of a toehold 
to the market when it is acquired.  
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 Malatesta (1993) Studied the effects of the Williams Act (1968) in the US 
and its impact on acquisitions, concluding that it reduces the expected gross 
present value of acquisition attempts. 
 
 As a result of regulation one can jump to the conclusion that the optimal 
bidding strategy to acquire the amount of shares that will result in a participation 
that is less than what is required by regulators to be disclosed.  
 
 Therefore, acquiring the maximum amount of shares without triggering the 
disclosure requirements would be the optimal position, followed by the launch of 
the bid immediately after. This in turn is argued to yield the benefits of acquiring 
a toehold without letting other potential rival bidders to know about this fact. 
  
In the sample subject to this study, some similarities and differences can 
be found when facing each country in terms of its regulatory specifics, as follows 
in the following table.  
 
 In the case of the American Market, phase one phase one, according to 
(Ravid and Spiegel 1999) is to obtain a toehold in the target as an open market 
operation. In the US, there are the Section 13 (d) and 14 (d) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act. Under 13 (d), whomever acquire more than 5% of the stock of a 
firm, it has 10 days to disclose its intentions, while having the ability during those 
10 days to continue to acquire stock.  
 
 “A complete acquisition must offer compensation both for those who 
voluntarily relinquish their position, and for those who are forced out against their 
will (Ravid and Spiegel 1999, 1222)” As a result, they argue, “a tender offer is 
divided into two parts, the second of which “cleans up” any shares not obtained in 
the first part (Ravid and Spiegel 1999, 1222)”. As a result, there seems to be a 
two-tiered bid, and the second bid has the function of ’’clean up’’, according to 
the paper Ravid and Spiegel (1999). 
 
Regarding the first tier bid, there are a series of requirements: 
 
I. The bid must remain open for 20 days at least; 
Thesis GRA 1903  01.09.2012 
 24 
II. The tenders must be taken up on a pro rata basis, which in turn leads to a 
non discrimination among target shareholders. 
 
 The second tier of the deal comes into play in case in the first round there 
is no sufficient number of shares held by the bidder in order to force a merger. “It 
is at this point that the legal framework becomes critical. Imagine that the bidder 
has acquired fifty per cent of the target company and that there is no legal 
protection for the minority shareholders (Ravid and Spiegel 1999, 1223)’’. 
 
To conclude, the regulatory environment in the European countries of this 
study is somewhat similar; therefore, I do not expect this to be a factor to explain 
differences in results. 
 
3.3. Moderators of acquisitions 
 
The main moderators of the acquisition-performance relationship 
identified in Haleblian et al. (2009) provide an introduction on what factors I am 
to include in the cross section analysis of the final section.  
 
I. Deal characteristics; payment type and deal type; 
II. Managerial effects: ownership and compensation, managerial experience; 
III. Firm characteristics; historical performance and firm size; 
IV. Environmental factors; waves and regulations. 
 
 It has been advanced that the payment method has an impact on 
shareholder’s wealth. Specifically, payment type has an impact on wealth effects 
with the literature generally agreeing that cash acquisitions tend to create value for 
acquirer’s shareholders. In fact, “… managers with informational advantages that 
enable them to acquire undervalued targets with high future growth prospects 
choose to finance such acquisitions with cash to ensure that, upon the revelation 
of the acquisition’s true market value, all of the associated gains accrue to the 
acquiring firm’s existing shareholders (Saxton 2004, 568)”. Cash acquisitions 
tend to have higher expected acquisition payoffs. The deal type subset refers to 
the empirical regularity that tender offers create more value than mergers as 
acknowledged in Bradley (1988) and Agrawal (1992).   
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Table II: Overview of relevant Takeover Laws per country of study
3
 
    Belgium   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price Threshold: More than 30% of voting rights (direct or indirect holding) 
  Price: highest of (i) highest price paid by the bidder during prior 12 mo. to announcement date 
  (ii) average trading price over 30 calendar days 
    
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, shares or a combination of both. Cash is required if: 
  (i) shares offered are not listed in a regulated market in the EU  
  (ii) bidder acquired shares in target for cash during previous 12 mo. to announcement 
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Disclosure is required if 5% of voting rights is reached, and has to be made as soon as possible, and 
a stake-building exercise no later than the 4th listing day after the threshold is crossed 
    
France   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price More than 33.3% or when increasing stakes by 2% of share capital or voting rights, within 12 mo. 
    
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, shares or a combination of both. Cash is required if: 
  (i) if bidder has 5% or more of shares in target for cash during 12 mo. prior to announcement date 
  (ii) shares offered are not listed in a regulated market in the EU  
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Regulatory thresholds: 5,10, 15, 20, 25, 33.3, 50, 66.7, 90 and 95 per cent, disclose in 4 days 
a stake-building exercise The authorities can request a statement even based on rumours of acquisition 
    
Germany   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price Threshold: More than 30% of voting rights (direct or indirect holding) 
 
Price: highest of (i) highest price paid by the bidder during prior 6 mo. to announcement date 
                                               
3 Source: Linklaters Advisors 
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  (ii) the average volume weighted market price over 3 months prior to the offer being announced 
    
Table II: Overview of relevant Takeover Laws per country of study 
  
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, liquid shares in a regulated EU market, or a combination of both. Cash is required if: 
  (i) if bidder has 5% or more of shares in target for cash during 6 mo. prior to announcement date 
  (ii) the bidder acquired an interest in the target off-market 
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Reaching, exceeding and falling below 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 and 75 per cent, disclose in 4 days 
a stake-building exercise Financial instruments are included in this provision 
    
Italy   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price Threshold: More than 30% of voting rights (direct or indirect holding) 
  More than 5% 12 mo. prior between 30-50 per cent 
  Price: at least equal to the highest price paid 12 mo. prior to the offer 
    
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, liquid shares in a regulated EU market, or a combination of both. Cash is required if: 
  (i) if bidder has 5% or more of shares in target for cash during 12 mo. prior to announcement date 
  (ii) shares offered are not listed in a regulated market in the EU  
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Reaching 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 66.7, 75, 90 and 95 per cent, disclose in 5 days 
a stake-building exercise   
    
Italy   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price Threshold: More than 30% of voting rights (direct or indirect holding) 
  Price: highest of (i) highest price paid by the bidder during prior 12 mo. to announcement date 
  (ii) average trading price over 12 mo. 
    
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, liquid shares in a regulated EU market, or a combination of both. Cash is required if: 
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Reaching 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 75 and 95 per cent 
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Table II: Overview of relevant Takeover Laws per country of study 
      
Belgium   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price Threshold: More than 33.3% or 50% of voting rights (direct or indirect holding) 
  Price: highest of (i) highest price paid by the bidder during prior 6 mo. to announcement date 
  (ii) average trading price in a regulated market over the same period 
    
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, liquid shares in a regulated EU market, or a combination of both 
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Reaching 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 33.3, 50, 66.7 or 90 per cent, disclose in 4 days  
a stake-building exercise   
    
Spain   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price Threshold: More than 30% of voting rights (direct or indirect holding) 
  (i) if stake increses by 5% in one or more acts within 12 mo. 
  (ii) reaches 50% or more 
  Price: highest of (i) highest price paid by the bidder during prior 12 mo. to announcement date 
    
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, liquid shares or a combination of both. Cash alternative always required 
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Reaching 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 60, 70, 75,80 and 90 per cent, disclose in 4 days  
a stake-building exercise   
    
Sweden   
    
Mandatory offer threshold and price Threshold: More than 30% of voting rights (direct or indirect holding) 
  Price: highest of (i) highest price paid by the bidder during prior 6 mo. to announcement date 
  (ii) highest price paid during acceptance period 
  (iii) Highest price paid 6 mo. of the start of the settlement 
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Table II: Overview of relevant Takeover Laws per country of study 
      
    
Mandatory bid consideration Cash, liquid shares or a combination of both. Cash alternative always required 
    
Disclosure obligations arising from Yes. Reaching 5, 10, 20, 25, 30, 50, 66.7 or 90 per cent 
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 Loughran and Anand (1997) Cites Majluf (1984) as firms will issue stock 
only when it is overvalued. As a result, it is straightforward to understand that 
firms prefer to pay cash if their stock is undervalued. Empirically, stock is used 
more in mergers versus cash in tender offers. 
 
Historical performance is studied in Lie (2002) showing that post 
acquisition performance is related with operating performance before and after the 
acquisition, or, equivalently, when high market to book companies acquire low 
book to market ones. Firm size is considered as well, this time in Healy, Palepu 
and Ruback (1992) where he found that large mergers have positive post 
acquisition accounting performance.  
 
 Ownership and compensation is related with agency perspectives, as there 
is a relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal returns for the 
acquirer Haleblian et al. (2009) and Palia (1995). 
 
 Waves are related with specific and temporal events that influence the 
market and its assessment of acquisitions. Banerjee (1998) Found that the early 
movers in a wave of M&A activity results value accretive for both bidders and 
targets. In terms of regulations, researchers found impacts caused by, and in the 
US, of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Williams Act in 1968, in studies of 
the like of Mullins (1983) and Malatesta (1993).  
 
 Petitt and Dumontier (2002) Studied 101 tender offers between 1980 and 
2000 found relationships with the deal type and studied wealth effects for two 
types of M&A deals in the French market, namely, control oriented and parent-
subsidiary bids. The aim is to explain, by finding determinants of the variation in 
results, an explanation to the difference in abnormal returns. The results they 
present are that tender offers are more profitable for target shareholders. 
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3.4. Conclusions of the Literature Review 
 
I. The primary reason for M&A activity is agency, not hubris Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993); 
II. Deal value Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Toehold size Le and Schultz 
(2007), and Firm size Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) are moderators of 
wealth effects. The deal type subset refers to the empirical regularity that 
tender offers create more value than mergers as acknowledged in Bradley 
(1988) and Agrawal (1992), cash acquisitions tend to create value for 
acquirer’s shareholders. In fact, “… managers with informational 
advantages that enable them to acquire undervalued targets with high 
future growth prospects choose to finance such acquisitions with cash to 
ensure that, upon the revelation of the acquisition’s true market value, all 
of the associated gains accrue to the acquiring firm’s existing shareholders 
(Saxton 2004, 568)”; 
III. “Results regarding returns to acquiring firms tend to be weak and 
contradictory (Malatesta 1983, 181)”; 
IV. Although theoretically toehold bidding should happen frequently, is not 
that common (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009)); 
V. Loughran and Anand (1997) That summarizes the relationships between 
returns, mode of acquisition and form of payment;  
VI. “Thus, government regulations and other changes that have occurred in the 
tender offer environment have been a zero sum game... (Bradley 1988, 
31)”;  
VII. In general, toeholds benefits bidders, lowers the bid premium, and 
increases the probability of takeover success Le and Schultz (2007); 
VIII. The regulatory environment in the European countries of this study is 
somewhat similar; therefore, I do not expect this to be a factor to explain 
differences in results. 
 




4.1. Economic problem  
 
Assuming that markets are able to incorporate all relevant information at 
announcement date of the merger or acquisition (therefore assuming markets are 
efficient) enables me to focus on stock returns as a measure of shareholder’s 
wealth effects. As in Haleblian et al. (2009) “Under the assumption of an efficient 
market, many scholars consider abnormal returns as the most effective technique 
to measure acquisition performance, ... (Haleblian et al. 2009, 493)” 
 
 In order to achieve this goal, and “given rationality… the effects of an 
event study will be reflected immediately in security prices (MacKinlay 1997, 
13)”, by measuring returns in a relatively short period of time, I am able to assess 
the impact of the bid on a shareholder perspective. 
 
4.2. Data collection, sources and screening process  
 
The data used in this study is formed by a screening process or filter where: 
 
I. Only deals where the acquirer and target are public; 
II. Only deals where the bidder is in the European Union; 
III. Only deals that prior to acquiring control of the target company, the 
acquirer has an initial shareholding of less than 50%. 
  
 The sources of information were Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg for 
stock prices and other market information. For other relevant information, Zephyr 






                                               
4 All event studies and regressions where performed using Stata 12 – Statistics Software 
Thesis GRA 1903  01.09.2012 
 32 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The sample consists of 64 deals from EU 27 countries gathered through 
the Zephyr database where both acquirers and targets are public companies. 
Furthermore, a search strategy was performed in order to identify toehold-bidding 
deals. My overall sample consists of 64 deals, meeting all the stated criteria, as 
presented in Table I. In table II follows the descriptive statistics of the data used in 
this work. Finally, all incomplete data was complemented with manual 
information gathered from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. 
 
4.4. Research methodology 
 
In order to carry out the event study, several steps must be fulfilled, namely: 
 
I. Define the event window – which normally and according to (MacKinlay 
1997, 14), “is greater than the specific period of interest”. In this study, 
and given ‘normal’ leakage of information it is of interest to assess both 
days before and after the announcement date. 
II. As a second step, the definition of the ‘selection criteria’ for adding a deal 
in the study. 
a. Then follows a summary of the sample characteristics (like market 
capitalization, industry representation, distribution of events 
through time) 
b. Identify biases 
III. Following this is the actual calculation of the Abnormal Returns 
IV. Formulation of the null hypothesis 
V. Finally, several techniques for aggregating individual firm returns is 
necessary. 
 
About event windows, as in (Haleblian et al. 2009, 493) “A primary 
advantage of event studies using short-window CARs is that changes in stock 
price can be attributed to the acquisition announcement with relative confidence 
by minimizing “noise” from other potentially confounding variables”.









1999 3 Austria 2 [0, 0.10] 48%
2000 2 Belgium 1 ].10; .20] 21%
2001 3 Bulgaria 1 [.20; .30] 11%
2002 4 Cyprus 3 [.30; .40] 5%
2003 5 France 2 ].40; .50] 5%
2004 3 Greece 6 ].50; .60] 3%
2005 6 Germany 11 ].60; .70] 0%
2006 5 Italy 15 ].70; .80] 0%
2007 13 UK 1 ].80; 1.0] 5%
2008 6 Netherlands 2 [1.0; ∞[ 2%
2009 5 Portugal 4
2010 4 Spain 14
2011 3 Sweden 2
2012 2
Total 64 Total 64 Average 10%
33%Average Toehold Size or Initial Shareholding
Panel III
This table presents descriptive statistics of the sample data retrieved 
from Zephyr, Bloomberg and DataStream. Only deals where both the 
acquirer and the bidder were considered, making the sample 
somewhat small but more reliable.
Number of 
Observations
Country of Bidder Bid Premium (BP)
Panel I Panel II
 
 
Initial stake less than 50%
EU 27
Exclusion criteria
This table presents the procedings taken in order to exclude observations beyond 
the scope of this study. The first column summarize the reasons, while second 
column presents the number of observations excluded while the third column 
Observations excluded Remaining observations
Listed Acquiror and Target
If acquiror increased its stake
Current deal status: 
58.259                          
43.303                          
25.067                          
285                               
221                            
14.956                       
18.236                       
24.782                       
64                                 
 
Table  III: Criteria of observation exclusion 
 
Table  IV: Descriptive Statistics 
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Of course there are arguments against using CARs “... markets are not 
omniscient (Haleblian et al. 2009, 493)” ... “As a result, markets incorporate the 
expected value accretion or dilution but not the (or less likely) the changes in 
value during the implementation of the acquisition (Haleblian et al. 2009, 493)”. 
 
As a result, there is a need to study long term buy and hold returns as in 
Loughran and Anand (1997). Nevertheless, they  “... exhibit potential confounding 
effects of firm performance (Haleblian et al. 2009, 493)”. 
 
 Different models have been proposed to carry out event studies. 
Specifically, there are two main categories, namely, statistical and economic. The 
former is based on statistical assumptions of the behaviour of asset returns 
MacKinlay (1997). The latter is based on assumptions of investor’s behaviour. A 
main assumption according to MacKinlay (1997) is that asset returns are jointly 
multivariate normal and independently and identically distributed through time, in 
statistical models, assumption followed as well in this work. 
 
 Next, I present a brief description of the different availables models and 
the justification of choosing the Market Model. 
 
4.5. Model Analysis 
 
4.5.1. Constant Mean Return Model 
 
 MacKinlay (1997) Justifies the use of these models based on the idea that 
they achieve similar results when compared with more sophisticated models. 
Specifically, what appears to determine these similar results is a “lack of 
sensitivity to the model can be attributed to the fact that the variance of the 
abnormal return is frequently not reduced much by choosing a more sophisticated 
model (MacKinlay 1997, 17)’’. So the addition of more factors or another form of 
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4.5.2. Market Model 
 
 This model, according to MacKinlay (1997) establishes a statistical 
relationship between returns of any given security with respect to the return of the 
market portfolio. As central assumptions we have a joint normality of asset 
returns, as mentioned before, assumed as well in this work. 
 
According to MacKinlay (1997), this model is an improvement over the 
constant mean return model because it “removes the portion of the return that is 
related to variation in the market’s return MacKinlay (1997, 18)’’. This gain can 
be quantified through the R-squared. In fact, the greater it is, the higher the 
variance reduction of the abnormal returns and larger the gain in explanatory 
power. 
 
4.5.3. Other statistical models 
 
 Generally, and according MacKinlay (1997) “gains from employing multi-
factor models for event studies are limited (MacKinlay 1997, 18)’’ which in turn 
is found to be because the “marginal explanatory powers of additional factors is 
small, and hence, there is little reduction in the variance of the abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay 1997, 18)’’. Therefore, as the sample does not belong to the same 
industry or other common characteristics, there is little advantage in a multi-factor 
model. 
 
4.5.4. Economic Models 
 
 According to MacKinlay (1997), Economic Models provide an 
opportunity to constrain normal return models, having, as the most known ones 
the CAPM – Capital Asset Pricing Model and the APT – Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory. 
 
 The CAPM is applied in Sharpe (1964) while the APT used by Ross 
(1976). The former constitutes an equilibrium theory where the expected return of 
a security is determined by its covariance with the market. The latter is an asset 
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pricing theory where the expected return of an asset is a linear combination of 
multiple risk factors. 
 
 As referred in MacKinlay (1997), one can use the market model in order to 
avoid, with little effort, the sensitivity of the results with restrictions in models 
like APT and CAPM assumed. 
 
 In terms of multifactor models inspired in the APT framework, in general, 
researchers found that the market factor is the most important while further 
explanatory variables brings limited added value.  
 
 After this analysis, I am choosing the market model with the argument 
advanced by MacKinlay (1997), where with limited effort, the sensitivity of 
results is avoided while at the same time establishing a statistical link between the 
return of any given security with respect to the return of the market portfolio. 
 




 Using OLS – Ordinary Least Squares is regarded as a consistent 
estimation procedure for the market model parameters. Moreover, asset returns 
are jointly multivariate normal and independently identically distributed through 
time resulting in efficient estimators as well. 
 
 “The abnormal return is the disturbance term of the market model 
calculated on an out of sample basis’’ and “The abnormal returns will be jointly 
normally distributed with a zero conditional mean MacKinlay (1997, 21)’’ 
 
 I will implement an event study introduced in Brown and Warner (1980) 
and Brown and Warner (1985), in a multi-country setting. As in Campa and 
Hernando (2004), I will implement an event study where the benchmark portfolio 
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is constructed using the market model for a benchmark portfolio as represented by 




 The abnormal returns are calculated compared to the expected returns as 
given by the Market Model using an ordinary least squares (OLS) method. As in 
MacKinlay (1997, 20), the parameters of the model are given by: 
 
 












Where  and  are the return in event period   for security   and the market 
respectively. 
 
The sample abnormal returns are given by: 
 
                                               
5 Event studies using each country’s benchmark was run with no significant changes in results 
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  Abnormal return 
  Return in event period   for security i 
     Return in event period   for the market  
 




 According to MacKinlay (1997), the first component of the variance, given 
by , is the disturbance variance. While the second component is the additional 
variance as a result of sampling error in  and   . As he argues, I am assuming 
that an estimation period of 120 days is large enough in order to consider the 
second term of the variance as null
6
. The result of this assumption is that the 
common sampling error for all event window observations stops leading to serial 




 Next, the Aggregation of Abnormal Returns is carried out in two 
dimensions, namely through time and across deals.  
 
4.6.1.1. Aggregation through time for an individual security 
 
 The CAR formula is given by, with  : 
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 Therefore, assuming 120 days of estimation window simplifies the 
calculation of the variance. 
 




 Having made the case for the aggregation of Abnormal Returns for a 
particular security, further I advance the discussion by introducing the 
Aggregation of Abnormal Returns for many deals, as tests with one event 
observation are not likely to be useful so it is necessary to aggregate. 
 
 In fact, another assumption is made MacKinlay (1997, 24). I am assuming 
that there is no overlap in terms of the timing of the different deals. In fact, this is 
a fair assumption to make given the time span, geographic diversity and number 
of deals. 
 
4.6.1.2. Aggregation across deals 
  
 The individual securities’ abnormal returns can be aggregated using, in 
order to be able to draw conclusions as, is not possible to draw conclusions from 
one deal only. 
 
 Therefore, I am aggregating in each point in time, the abnormal returns of 
all deals. 
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 “Using these estimates, the abnormal returns for any event period can be 
analysed MacKinlay (1997, 24)’’. 
 
 The next step is to calculate the aggregated average abnormal returns over 
the event window, across different deals, using the same approach as that used to 
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 Then, for any interval in the vent window - In the absence of abnormal 
returns, average CAR should be zero. 
 
 “For the variance estimators the assumption that the event windows of the 
N securities do no overlap is used to set the covariance terms to zero (MacKinlay 
1997, 24)”. 
 




 In order to test for the statistical significance of the results, I will use as 
guideline the work of MacKinlay (1997), where the hypothesis formulation would 
be: 
 There are no abnormal returns 
 There are abnormal returns 
 




 Next, the cross section regression and framework used is presented. 
 
4.7. Cross Section Regression 
 
 In consonance with previous studies in M&A toeholds, I will perform a 
regression analysis on the statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns I 
find in order to identify other factors that may explain those returns other than the 
toehold in it. As a result, I can refine the analysis and be sure if the toehold is the 
main cause for those returns or there are other factors influencing that result at the 
same time. 
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 As a result, I will use regressions to estimate the unknown effect of 
changing one variable over another one (Watson 2003, Ch. 4). Two assumptions I 
am making when I run a regression: 
I. There is a linear relationship between the variables; 
II. The relationship is additive. 
 
 Other than that, I am assuming that the variances of the residuals are 
homoscedastic or constant “The error term (e) is homoscedastic if the variance of 
the conditional distribution of (  given  [var ( | )], is constant for i=1…n; 
and in particular does not depend on x; otherwise, the error term is homoscedastic 
Watson (2003, 126). 
 
 For the sake of completeness, I will perform a test to see whether I am 
including all the variables that I need to explain the cumulative abnormal returns. 
This is important because it is related to the assumption that the error term and 




Missing variables are very important to acknowledge because if we do not 
include them and “are correlated with the included regressor” and “the omitted 
variable is a determinant of the dependent variable (Watson 2003, 144)”, the 
conclusion would be that our regression coefficients are inconsistent. 
 
 In this case I will be running a multiple regression model, therefore I am 
assuming that the independent variables are not perfectly multicolinear, meaning, 
one regressor should not be a linear function of another. 
 
 At this point, I will present the guidelines I use to build a regression model 
(Gelman 2007, 69): 
 
I. Make sure all relevant predictors are included, based on the theory and 
knowledge of the topic, 
II. Strategy to keep or drop variables: 
a. Predictor not significant and has the expected sign – Keep it 
                                               
7 Based on the Princeton Stata Regression Guide 
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b. Predictor not significant and does not have the expected sign – Drop it 
c. Predictor is significant and has the expected sign – Keep it 
d. Predictor is significant but does not have the expected sign – Review, 




5.1. Measuring and analysing Abnormal Returns  
 
The main results of the event study are presented in Table V where I 
combined different event windows and reported each Cumulative Abnormal 
Return - CAR. In addition, I decomposed the results per region, in order to 
identify regions where toehold bidding generates more value, based on general 
perception of traders and media of Core European countries (France and 
Germany), the intrinic PIGS definition and non Core European countries called 
Periphery, based throught this divicion on the EU with 27 members. 
 
 Interestingly, in this sample, the only statistically significant result can be 
verified in the Core region while at the same time, and even more surprisingly, it 
is negative. Therefore, the main conclusion of Table V is that toehold bidding in 
Europe does not add statistically significant value. 
 
 In order to assess whether there might still be regions that present results 
in accordance with previous literature in the US market, a different event study 




In this table average Cumulative Abnormal Returns - CAR are presented over the event 
window. The symbols *, ** and *** relate with statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
per cent, repectively.
M&A Toehold Bidding (N=64)














Table  V: Market reactions to toehold bidding over the estimation window 
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 Table VI shows average CAR for each event window per different regions. 
In general, M&A toeholds are value dilutive, although in most of these results, not 
in a statistically significant manner. The only exception is for Core European 





In this table average Cumulative Abnormal Returns - CAR are presented over the event 
window. The symbols *, ** and *** relate with statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
per cent, repectively.
M&A Toehold Bidding (N=64) - Periphery





M&A Toehold Bidding (N=64) - Core











M&A Toehold Bidding (N=64) - PIGS




By analysing Table VI, it is striking the difference with previous studies, 
as there is only evidence of statistically significant value dilution in the very short-
term event window and only for core European countries. 
 
 Graph I illustrates the same results, being evident that as the event window 
grows larger, other factors come in play, influencing results towards making them 
increasingly negative. 
 
Table  VI: Event Study results for different regions 
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Graph II aggregates across all deals the CARs and plots for each event 
window day the aggregated CAR for all the deals. As can be seen, the behaviour 
is very irregular, fact that may be explained by the reduced size of the sample. 
 
 Another observation is that statistically significant CARs across deals 
occur in event dates of more than 20 days before and more than 15 days after the 
announcement date.  
 
Graph II: Aggregating CARs accross deals.  
Statistically significant results are signaled above the CAR’s curve with its t-test 
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To conclude, these results are not in consonance with the main results of 
American studies such as in Carroll and Griffith (2010), Betton, Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2009), Farinha and Miranda (2003), Le and Schultz (2007) and Franks 
and Harris (1989), although agreeing with (Malatesta 1983), Haleblian et al. 
(2009) and with Franks and Harris (1989). 
 
5.2. Correlations and factors 
5.2.1. Deal characteristics 
 By analysing the correlation between the different characteristics of the 
deals, I can: 
 
I. Exclude those factors that are highly correlated between each other in a 
regression in order to do the cross sectional analysis; 
II. I can spot relationships that may be useful in determining which factors to 
include in the regression. 
 
 After analysing correlations in Table VII, it is worthy to note: 
 
I. High negative correlation between event date and CARs; 
II. High correlation between percentage bought and CARs; 
III. High negative correlation between revenues of the Target Company and 
CARs. 
 
 After analysing Table VII against the CAR per deal, the main conclusions 
are that potentially event dates, percentage bought and revenues might be 
important moderators of results, despite being relatively low in correlation 
magnitude (around 20%). The explanatory power of the different factors can be 
determined using an R
2 
measure, which follows in Table VIII, which turns out to 
be very weak accross the different moderators. This is found to be good as the 
different factors tend not to correlate too much with each other but, at the same 
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5.2.2. Cross section study 
 
 As mentioned before, a cross section analysis is presented while having 
the objective of, based on previous study’s findings, try to explain statistically 
significant results found. Next, I present a table with regressions performed and an 
explanation to justify theoretically the inclusion of those potential moderators in 
the regression. Justifications for the inclusion of each variable: 
 
I. Pay – Method of payment is recognized in (Loughran and Anand 1997) as 
being a statistically significant moderator of wealth effects. The expected 
signs are positive for cash and negative for stocks; 
II. Date – Date of the deal can incorporate information on financial markets 
cycles, as the waves aspect explained before, citing Banerjee (1998). The 
expected signal would be negative, as the deals coincide  with the 
beginning of an upturn in M&A activity after 2001; 
III. Value – Deal value is found by (Floreani and Rigamonti 2001) to be a 
statistically significant moderator of results. The expected sign is positive; 
IV. Stake – Initial shareholdings (toehold size) is recognized in Betton and 
Eckbo (2000) as being a statistically significant moderator of results. Here, 
the higher the size of the toehold, the lower the bid premium, therefore the 
higher the gains from holding the toehold. As a result, the expected sign is 
positive; 
V. Bought – As explained while citing (Bradley 1988, 32), with an expect 
positive sign; 
VI. Bid premium – Bid premium is recognized in Walkling (1985), (Asquith 
and Kieschnick 1999)  and B. Espen (2009) as being a statistically 
significant moderator of results. In this case, the lower the bid premium, 
the better, so a negative sign is expected; 
VII. Market – Relative size is recognized in Asquith and Kieschnick (1999) as 
being a statistically significant moderator of results. The expected sign is 
positive; 
VIII. Revenue – is a measure of fundamentals of the target company and would 
represent an accounting measure of the size of the target. The expected 
sign is the same as the Deal Value and Market (or relative size), therefore 
positive. 




























 measure for different potential explanatory variables 
pay country date val stake bought bp mkt revn car
pay 1.00 0.22     (0.36) (0.08) (0.08) 0.41    0.03  (0.14) (0.11) 0.09  
country 1.00     (0.15) (0.15) 0.11  0.23    0.11  (0.08) 0.01  (0.08) 
date 1.00  0.13  (0.07) (0.43)   (0.09) (0.09) 0.15  (0.22) 
val 1.00  0.09  (0.27)   (0.07) (0.08) 0.03  0.03  
stake 1.00  (0.49)   0.03  0.00  (0.05) (0.06) 
bought 1.00    0.17  (0.11) 0.07  0.18  
bp 1.00  (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
mkt 1.00  (0.03) (0.02) 
revn 1.00  (0.16) 
car 1.00  
pay country date val stake bought bp mkt revn car
pay 100% 15% 18% 1% 1% 18% 0% 3% 2% 1%
country 100% 2% 2% 2% 8% 3% 0% 0% 2%
date 100% 2% 0% 21% 1% 2% 3% 5%
val 100% 1% 8% 1% 1% 0% 0%
stake 100% 26% 0% 0% 0% 1%
bought 100% 3% 1% 1% 3%
bp 100% 1% 1% 0%
mkt 100% 0% 0%
revn 100% 3%
car 100%
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Table IX: Regression summary 
In this table a series of regression is performed to apply (Gelman 2007, 69) framework and find a good regression fit. 
Results for cross-sectional regression of CARs with identified moderators. The dependent variable is CAR [-30; +30]. 
The symbols *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 
_Ipay_2 0.149*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 
  -0.0107 -0.0172 -0.0171 -0.0317 -0.0314 -0.0328 -0.034 -0.0341 
_Ipay_3 0.019* 0.032 0.032 0.037 0.03 0.028 0.028 0.022 
  -0.0209 -0.0237 -0.0244 -0.0364 -0.0366 -0.0372 -0.0375 -0.0381 
_Ipay_4 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 
  -0.0233 -0.0218 -0.0214 -0.022 -0.0205 -0.0211 -0.0213 -0.0196 
_Ipay_5 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.017 
  -0.0184 -0.0186 -0.0185 -0.0188 -0.0194 -0.0223 -0.0218 -0.0224 
_Ipay_6 -0.046 -0.046 -0.045* -0.046* -0.038 -0.031 -0.031 -0.028 
  -0.0107 -0.0108 -0.0112 -0.0133 -0.0288 -0.0372 -0.0392 -0.0396 
date   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
val     0 0 0 0 0 0 
        0 0 0 0 0 
stake       0.019 0.047 0.056 0.056 0.068 
        -0.109 -0.135 -0.145 -0.15 -0.15 
bought         0.033 0.042 0.042 0.061 
          -0.0776 -0.0883 -0.0938 -0.0949 
bp           -0.017 -0.017 -0.022 
            -0.0279 -0.0277 -0.028 
mkt             0 0 
              -1.00E-04 -1.00E-04 
revn               -.000159*** 
                -4.00E-05 
_cons -0.002 0.123 0.128 0.115 0.063 0.056 0.057 0.014 
  -0.0107 0.0877 -0.0894 -0.109 -0.159 -0.167 -0.186 -0.186 
R
2
 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.17 
Adj. R
2
 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
RMSE 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
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As can be seen in Table IX, method of payment and revenues of target seem to have some 
explanatory power of the CARs found. By applying (Gelman 2007, 69) framework, two more 
regression were performed, as presented in Table X. 
 
Table X: Regression Summary 
Results for cross-sectional regression of CARs with identified 
moderators. The dependent variable is CAR [-30; +30]. The 
symbols *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Model 1 2 
  car car 
_Ipay_2 0.140***   
  -0.0259   
_Ipay_3 0.0281   
  -0.0345   
_Ipay_4 -0.0109   
  -0.0212   
_Ipay_5 -0.0143   
  -0.0227   
_Ipay_6 -0.0306   
  -0.0326   
stake 0.0779 0.0262 
  -0.129 -0.106 
bought 0.0588 0.068 
  -0.0728 -0.0568 
bp -0.0222 -0.0228 
  -0.0272 -0.0206 
revn -0.000162*** -0.000172*** 
  -0.0000433 -0.0000426 
_cons -0.0449 -0.0321 
  -0.0697 -0.0582 
      
N 64 64 
R
2
 0.16 0.07 
Adj. R
2
 0.02 0.01 
RMSE 0.0632 0.0635 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001     
 
 Explanatory power is filtered by factors in Models 1 and 2 of Table X, which were found to 
be adequate thanks to the (Gelman 2007, 69). Nevertheless, R
2
 remains stable at 16% and 7%, 
respectively, for models 1 and 2. 
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 To conclude, I do not find in this factors a satisfactory explanatory power of the behavior of 
CARs in this sample, as a result, some other factors should be added in future research, which 
would have to be justified in a novel manner as these were in consonance with present literature. 
 
5.3. Why divergence in results from previous studies? 
  
 By carrying out the cross section study, I found that no previously found regressor is a 
statistically significant moderator of variations in results. Different factors can explain this, such as 
the small sample used, the specific geography and other intrinsic characteristics. Nevertheless, in 
order not to fall in data mining while being as well limited in the availability of data, it is for future 
research on the subject in Europe to both enlarge the sample by other manual means and to advance 




 To conclude, it is surprisingly rare the number of deals where a toehold is present. In this 
sample, only a total of 64 deals out of a universe of 15’241 (EU 27, completed and with listed 
acquirer and target) have a toehold, which translates into a portion of 0.42%.  
 
 The statistically significant headline result of -1.28% in a [-2; +2] event window for core 
European countries is in consonance with the idea of contradictory results often found in this field 
as stated in (Malatesta 1983). It agrees as well with the review of Haleblian et al. (2009) and with 
Franks and Harris (1989). It does not agree with Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), Carroll and Griffith 
(2010), Le and Schultz (2007) and Farinha and Miranda (2003). 
 
 From the cross section study, I find that method of payment and revenues of the target are 
statistically significant moderators that explain the pattern in CARs. Nevertheless, the explanatory 
power as measured by the R
2 
is not satisfactory and future research should be directed to both 
enlarge the sample and to add new moderators of shareholder’s wealth effects. 
 
 Three ideas can provide leeway for future research. One is that these results might be related 
with corporate governance issues in Europe as it is acknowledged to be less protective for minority 
shareholders. As a result, small toehold holders might be in disadvantage versus its American 
counterparts.  
 
Thesis GRA 1903  01.09.2012 
 
Another possible explanation might be that these acquisitions have agency issues related to 
them. As acknowledged in Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993, 350-351), this leads to value dilutive 
acquisitions in the US, which might be the case as for Europe as well. 
 
 Finally, and as exposed in Malatesta (1983), the methodology in itself might not be 
adequate. The acquisition of a toehold might signal a too strong signal that a future acquisition will 
happen, therefore all the gains at the event date were already priced in at the time of the acquisition 
of the toehold. As a result, and as a potential solution, an event study would need to be carried out 
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8. Economic Problem 
The market for corporate control is characterized by numerous strategies of 
delivering successful acquisitions and mergers. These strategies are implemented 
in order to have positive shareholder wealth effects with an important amount of 
articles focusing on this aspect.  
 
The motivation that has led the emergence of M&A activity has been subject to 
study by academics through history. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) In their 
research they advance a method to distinguish among the principal motives that 
are put forward by the literature. These three main motives that keep alive the 
contest for corporate control are the synergy, agency and hubris motives 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993, 350-351). 
 
The synergy motive is based on the premise that bidders and targets negotiate 
takeovers when both parties gain from the process, therefore, the primary reason 
that lead the companies involved to negotiate a merger or acquisition is the 
existence of a perception that the two companies complement each other and 
together they can achieve more than they would alone. 
 
Another reason is acknowledge as the agency motive; entrenched in the idea that 
bidder’s management benefit from a transfer of value from shareholders to 
themselves due to an increase in managements’ well being as they control more 
assets or by the possibility that shareholders may become more dependent on 
current management as they engage in these takeover activities. 
 
Finally, they identify in the literature the Hubris hypothesis, where takeover 
rational lay on pure misconceptions by the bidders’ management and that there is 
no synergy gains.  
 
In Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), they cite some studies that try to clarify 
which of the previous motives is the dominant one in the market for corporate 
control. Nevertheless, no conclusive result is available. That is why in their study 
they divide a new method and hypothesis that are implemented in order to clarify 
this issue, being therefore the primary contribution of their study. 
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After studying the relationship between target and total gains in M&A activity, 
they were able to advance hypothesis in order to test which of the motives is the 
most important one using data of 330 tender offers during 1963-1988 (Berkovitch 
and Narayanan 1993, 349). They conclude that the synergy is the strongest reason 
for takeovers, although there can be identified some deals where other reasons 
were relevant, namely agency and hubris.  
 
In other papers, such as the review by Haleblian et al. (2009), another 





I. Value creation, as a subset, which incorporates market power seeking, 
efficiency gains, resource redeployment and market discipline. 
II. Managerial self-interest, as a subset, which incorporates compensation, 
hubris and target defence tactics. 
III. Environmental factors, as a subset, which incorporates environmental 
uncertainty, regulation, imitation, resource dependence and networks ties.  
IV. Firm characteristics, as a subset, which incorporates acquisition experience 
and firm strategy and position. 
 
Having introduced the motives for the existence of the market for corporate 
control, it follows a narrowing down to the strategies used to carry them on, 
focusing on the toehold bidding strategy. 
 
A toehold is defined by Asquith and Kieschnick (1999, 1) as “The initial 
shareholding of a bidder in the target firm prior to bidding”. The rational of 
toehold bidding is very strong within the finance theory and its study has been 
associated with its relationship with takeover premiums, the probability of success 
and impact on shareholders’ wealth. 
 
In Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), they state that the rationale of acquiring a 
toehold before making a bid for the firm is based on the idea that it creates value 
                                               
8 For more details refer to Haleblian, Jerayr, Cynthia E. Devers, Gerry McNamara, Mason A. 
Carpenter and Robert B. Davison. 2009. "Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and 
Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda." Journal of Management, 35 (3): 469-502. doi: 
10.1177/0149206308330554. 
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by reducing the amount of shares to be purchased in the tender offer for all 
remaining shares at the offered. This offer price as it includes the control premium 
and valued synergies, it could prove higher than the price at which the initial stake 
in the company was purchased, being a source of gains in the case when rival 
bidders appear in the contest for the firm and offer higher prices for the company, 
having a positive impact on the initial holdings of the toehold owner.  
 
This rational for toehold bidding has also been subject of study in a sizeable 
amount of articles. In the study conducted in Carroll and Griffith (2010), they 
found that even when hostile takeovers are not successful, these bidders gain 
significant abnormal returns compared to those without a toehold. In fact, they 
found that abnormal returns average 4.98% for those hostile bids with a toehold 
compared to 0.06% to those hostile bids with no toehold. 
 
In the review carried out by B. Espen (2009), it is evident another strand of 
literature focusing on the takeover premium and its relationship with bidding 
strategies in takeovers. For instance, in Asquith and Kieschnick (1999), they 
found a negative correlation between the size of the toehold and the takeover 
premium, while also achieving greater understanding on the dynamics of the 
factors in play as they acknowledge a relationship, that needs further study, with 
these results and the size of the target firm. 
 
Studies such as the one of Walkling (1985) focuses primarily on the relevance of 
the bid premium in the outcome of the takeover, where they conclude that in fact 
the bid premium is a statistically significant determinant of the probability of 
success in the takeover process. 
 
Betton and Eckbo (2000) Study the probability of takeover success through a tree 
of different outcomes during the negotiation process. They found that the greater 
the size of the toehold, the lower the probability of rival bidders entering the 
contest and also the lower the probability of target resistance. Finally, they are 
able to find a negative relationship between the size of the toehold and bid 
premiums and run-ups (appreciation of the stock of the target prior to the tender 
offer). 
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Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) Show that greater toeholds lower offer 
premiums while increasing the probability that the first bidder wins. 
 
On the other hand, other articles focus on the wealth effect of toehold bidding. 
Driven by this line of thought, I present the case for this thesis. For that, I present 
the motivation and implications of this study. Following, a literature review on 
this line of thought is presented. 
9. Motivation and Implications 
This thesis aims to answer the central question of whether there is a case for 
‘Toehold Bidding’ in the market comprised by the PIIGS countries – Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. The implications would be to assess the wealth 
effect on shareholders, as measured by the bidders abnormal returns, prior and 
after the completion of the acquisition process. For that, a comparison with deals 
where toeholds are not present would yield interesting results and finally, a cross-
sectional study is carried out in order to assess whether the identified abnormal 
returns are in fact statistically affected only or mostly by the existence of a 
toehold as it could be the case that other bid characteristics may have an impact. 
 
In Carroll and Griffith (2010), an study comparing hostile bids with and without 
toehold performance for the bidders’ shareholders is examine. Interestingly 
enough, they find that unsolicited bids (hostile) increase incentives for targets’ 
management and to seek other bidders, which in turn enhances the returns for the 
original bidder on the toehold. For their sample, hostile bidders with a toehold 
earn a significant abnormal return of 4.98% compared to 0.06% when no toehold 
is present. Furthermore, they conclude that for bidders with a toehold of less than 
35%, it is probable that the bidder will withdraw anyway, making the case that 
hostile bidders with toeholds implemented this strategy in order to attract rival 
bidders and to profit from their toehold on the target firm. This study is a main 
source of inspiration for this thesis, although I won’t be differentiating between 
hostile or friendly bids. 
 
The implications are related to whether there is a puzzle or not in these markets, 
as there is in the US, according to Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), where a 
the number of toehold related bids has been decreasing contrary to the theoretical 
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advantages of toehold bidding. In fact, in their sample, there were 13% among 
more than 10’000 initial bids were toehold bidding was present. 
 
In the literature, one can find arrays of studies where the suggestion that 
acquisitions do not enhance shareholders’ value is present, neither in the short nor 
in the long term. Specifically, in Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), they found that US 
bidders of Canadian firms earn statistically insignificant abnormal returns. In 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), they performed an event study at 
announcement of the merger and found that returns are not significantly different 
from zero (Healy, Palepu and Ruback 1992, 157). 
 
Although other studies can be found, it is a motivation to see whether toehold 
bidding in the markets of interest for this thesis, it can be found statistically 
significant abnormal returns that rend valuable corporate takeovers when toeholds 
are present, as in Carroll and Griffith (2010). 
10. Literature Review 
In Carroll and Griffith (2010), an comparative analysis on takeover contests in the 
presence of toehold bidding and in hostile bids, was conducted. They conclude 
that, on average, bidders earn significant abnormal returns of 4.98% while those 
without toeholds gain 0.06% return. 
 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) Focus on shareholder returns in public firms 
that successfully completed five or more public, private, or subsidiary targets. 
They found that, if they include in their analysis bidders’ characteristics, they 
could study the variations resulting from these characteristics.  
 
Loughran and Anand (1997) Directed their study towards considering the 
shareholder wealth effect of the bidder after the acquisition has been carried out 
(post acquisition returns) finding correlations with the form of payment during 
five years after the acquisition of the company. In their case, an interesting fact is 
that they adjusted for size (as market value of equity) and book-to-market as the 
appropriate benchmark for abnormal returns. They conclude that (1) bidder 
returns are higher when cash is used as payment method for a tender offer; (2) 
bidder returns are lower when the payment method is stocks in a merger offer. 
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Elgers and Clark (1980) Studied stock returns after an acquisition of a company 
using a Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model. The results are consistent with 
previous research at the time where significant gains are present for the buyer and 
greater gains are present for the seller. 
 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) Studied shareholders wealth effects on acquisitions at 
the announcement date in Canada by domestic and US firms. They found that 
domestic bidders (Canadian) present significant abnormal returns while US firms 
do not present abnormal returns at announcement. This is a study relevant for this 
thesis in order than it represents the kind of study I set out to do, although 
focusing on the ones where toehold bidding exists and involving different 
countries. 
 
Campa and Hernando (2004) Studied European M&As by calculating abnormal 
returns of each deal relative to the local value weighted equity index. And then 
studied the determinants of those returns. 
 
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) Paper examined shareholders wealth effects in 
European, American and Australian M&A in the insurance industry. This article is 
of particular interest for this thesis since it performs the kind of study (event 
study) to determine the wealth effects that I will develop in this thesis except for 
the fact that they focused on M&A in general and not only on toehold bidding 
M&A in particular and its somewhat narrow in their objective as they restricted 
their study to the insurance industry. It is an interesting paper since they focus on 
different countries to study wealth effects, which in this thesis will be carried out.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that contrary to the study of Campa and Hernando 
(2004), they created an index for the sample in the insurance industry worldwide. 
In this thesis however, I will perform the analysis using each countrys’ market 
index and only then average the results, being consistent with Campa and 
Hernando (2004). 
 
In Haleblian et al. (2009), a review of what is known about M&A activity in 
general is presented. Taking into consideration that as bidders pay a premium for 
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control, is natural for target shareholders to gain significant abnormal returns 
(Haleblian et al. 2009, 470). Therefore, I will focus primarily in my thesis on 
abnormal returns for bidder shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, generally is known that acquisitions do not add value to acquirers’ 
shareholders (Haleblian et al. 2009, 470), there are situations in which value 
added outcomes can be identified. Therefore, this thesis will assess whether 
toehold bidding in the PIIGS market is value adding. 
 
Le and Schultz (2007) Studied toeholds and its performance in the Australian 
market acknowledging that the literature finds significant positive abnormal 
returns for the target firm but results for the bidding firms are not conclusive. In 
their case, they found that there is a positive relationship between toeholds size 
and abnormal returns of bidders’ shareholders. 
 
Farinha and Miranda (2003) Study M&A events in Portugal for the period 
between 1989 and 2001. In their article, they focus more on the run up period to 
the acquisition but also find a positive relationship between the presence of 
toeholds with the magnitude of the run up effect and abnormal returns. Despite 
this fact, the thesis would expand on this research on the particular case of 
Portugal as it would consider a more recent sample and compare it to results in 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. This, in fact is one of the guidance they provide 
to further expand their research. 
 
Petitt and Dumontier (2002) Study wealth effects for two types of M&A deals in 
the French market, namely, control oriented and parent-subsidiary bids. The aim 
is to explain, by finding determinants of the variation in results, an explanation to 
the difference in abnormal returns.  
 
Franks and Harris (1989) Study wealth effects in the UK between 1955 and 1985. 
The interesting result is that they find for the UK market that gains between the 
target and bidder, when a toehold was present; the total gains are approximately 
equally distributed between target and bidders. Also, they found that there are 
approximately the same wealth effects for bidders with and without a toehold, 
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concluding on this issue that it is indifferent in their sample to engage in toehold 
bidding. 
11. Methodology 
In order to answer that question, I will implement an event study introduced in 
Brown and Warner (1980) and Brown and Warner (1985), in a multi-country 
setting. As in Campa and Hernando (2004), I will implement an event study 
where the benchmark portfolio is constructed using the market model for a 
benchmark portfolio as represented by a world market index that will be retrieved 
from Datastream.  
 
The abnormal returns are calculated compared to the expected returns as given by 
the Market Model using an ordinary least squares (OLS) method. As in 














  Abnormal return 
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  Return in event period  for security i 
     Return in event period  for the market  
Where its conditional variance would be: 
 
 
The cumulative abnormal return formula is given by: 
 
 
As  (length of estimation window) increases, the variance of  is: 
 
 




In order to test for the statistical significance of the results, I will use as guideline 
the work of MacKinlay (1997), where the hypothesis formulation would be: 
 
 There are no abnormal returns  
 There are abnormal returns  
 










An application of this methodology would be present both for toehold bids and for 
non toehold bids in order to compare the results as in Carroll and Griffith (2010). 
 
Finally, in order to implement a cross sectional study, I would use a logistic 
regression where a number of dummy variables representing the deals’ 
characteristics would be included in the model to assess whether other factors are 
or not influencing the results of the event study. 
12. Data 
The sample ranges from 1999 until 2010 of deals taken from Zephyr that fulfilled 
the criteria of being: 
 
I. Deals within Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain  
II. Only completed deals  
III. Only when a toehold as defined of being the bidder holding less than 50% 
of shares before bidding for a sufficient amount of shares to acquire 
control (as defined as holding more than 50% of targets’ shares)  
IV. Where both the target and bidder are public firms. 
 
For each bidder I will collect stock market prices from Datastream. In this 
preliminary report, the sample of deals with toehold bids is characterized by a 
total value of €83bn for 45 deals, while the mean value is of €1.3bn represented 
by an average toehold size of 33.50%. 
 
Following, I present a preliminary table where the number of deals with toehold 
bidding, in the regions studied, is presented.  
 
An interesting fact is that at this point and relying on Zephyr Database, there are 
no deals with toehold bids in Ireland since 1999 until 2011.  
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TABLE I 
Number of M&A deals n the PIIGS region in the sample from 1999-2011 




   2000 2 1 1 
   2001 0 





2003 11 1 3 
 
4 2 































   2011 1 
    
1 
Total 45 4 15 0 16 10 
Data compiled from Zephyr Database for Completed Deals, where both bidder and target are 
public firms, where a toehold is defined by a pre-bid holding of less than 50%, regardless of being 
a domestic or cross border M&A. 
13. Further Progress Outline 
In order to carry out this study, further deepening on data collection proves 
necessary. Namely: 
 
I. Gathering announcement dates for tender offers in the deals with toehold 
and no toehold bidding.  
II. Collecting through Zephyr Database deals where no-toehold bids are 
present, for the geographical areas of interest.  
III. Retrieve data from Datastream of a relevant world market index in order 
for it to function as my benchmark portfolio in which to carry out the 
event study.  
IV. Organize and retrieve necessary data in order to form the variables that 
characterize the deals in order to carry out the cross-sectional study. 
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